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NOTE'S AND COMMENTS
The result in the instant case is apparently correct, but the rationale of the decision is not clear. The court gives no reason for its
decision other than to say dogmatically that "such occupancy (by the
possessor of the land) is consistent with, and not as a matter of law
adverse to, the possession of the prior lessee." It is believed that
the same result could have been reached on the basis of other decisions: First, the timber case, mentioned above, 12 in which the lease
was held to create a separate interest in fee in the timber against
which adverse possession of the land alone would not be effective;
and, second, by reasoning from analogy to the mineral cases. 13
W. E.

ANGLIN.

Res Judicata-Judgment in Ejectment Suit as Res Judicata
Preventing Restitution of Land.
A judgment of interpleader, construing a will, gave B a right to
rents and profits accruing from a certain tract of land. While an
appeal was pending B brought an action in ejectment against A, who
was in possession of the tract, and recovered. A did not appeal.
The original judgment of interpleader was reversed on appeal, the
court construing the will in favor of A. A now brings an action in
ejectment to regain possession of the land. Held: The first judgment in ejectment not having been appealed from is res judicata as
to the question of the title to the land (Cardozo, Brandeis, and Stone,
JJ., dissenting).'
The majority of the court explains its decision upon the ground
that the original suit in equity for rents and profits and the first suit
in ejectment were separate and unrelated suits. Therefore, the reversal of the original judgment did not give grounds for restitution
as to the lands in the ejectment suit. The minority contends that the
first action in ejectment was dependent upon the interpleader judgment, and that this second suit in ejectment is in effect a suit for
restitution to which the plaintiff is entitled.
If the construction placed upon the will by the interpleader judgment-that the title to the land in question was in B-is conclusive
until reversed, then the first ejectment judgment was dependent upon
the interpleader judgment. The general rule is that where a judg' Southwestern Lumber Co. of N. 1. v. Evans, supra note 4.
"' Claybrooke v. Barns; Kentucky Block Cannel Coal Co. v. Seawell, both
supra note 5.
SReed v. Allen, 286 U. S. 191, 52 Sup. Ct. 532, 76 L. ed. 749 (1932). This
case has been commented upon in (1932) 88 U. oF PA. L. REv. 77.
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ment determines the title under which a party claims, it is res judicata

as to any other property or right claimed under the same title in a
subsequent action between the same parties. 2 Applying the rule to
the instant case it seems clear that the trial court in the first action
in ejectment was bound by the previous construction of the will. In
fact, the only defense pleaded by A in the first ejectment action was
in the nature of a plea in abatement on the grounds that the question
of title was pending on appeal. Therefore, a reversal of the interpleader judgment ought to give grounds for restoring the parties to
their original position.

The doctrine of restitution operates to restore to a litigant that
which is lost by reason of the subsequent reversal of a judgment.3 But apparently the courts have limited this rule to prop2"But
where a judgment determines the title or right under which a party
claims, it is decisive as to any other property or right claimed under that
same title." 34 C. J. 906. Brock v. Boyd, 211 Ill. 290, 71 N. E. 995, 103
Am. St. Rep. 200 (1904) (a decree in adoption proceedings on which title
depends is res judicata as to another suit for partition of land) ; Mass. v.
Brant, 216 Mo. 641, 116 S.W. 503 (1909) (judgment declaring void a judgment under which land was sold is res judicata as to purchaser of land);
Angelo v. Aldridge, 164 Ill.
388, 45 N. E. 722 (1896) (a decree for rents and
profits is res judicata as to subsequent suit for partition) ; Sou. Pac. Ry. v.
United States, 168 U. S. 1, 18 Sup. Ct. 18, 42 L. ed. 355 (1897) ; Johnson v.
Victoria Chief Copper M. & S. Co., 150 App. Div. 653, 135 N. Y. Supp. 1070
(1912) ; Re Lart, [1896] 2 Ch. 788, 65 L. J.Ch. N. S. 846, 72 L. T. N. S. 175;
Carson v. McCormick Harvesting Machine Co., 18 Tex. Civ. App. 225, 44 S. W.
406 (1898).
Contra: Malona v. Schwing, 101 Ky. 56, 39 S. W. 523 (1897).
"Where a judgment or decree of an inferior court is reversed by a final
judgment in a court of review, a party is in general entitled to restitution
of all things lost by reason of the judgment in the lower court." 18 Enc. P1.
& Pr. 871.
This doctrine of restitution originated in the common law as a part of the
inherent power of the courts. Ranson v. City of Pierre, 101 Fed. 665 (C. C.
A. 8th, 1900); Skinner v. Hannon, 30 N. Y. Supp. 987 (1884). However,
today it is controlled by statutes in a great many states. N. C. CoDE ANN.
(Michie, 1931) §1534; ALA. CODE (Michie, 1928) §§8023, 8030; VA. CODE
ANN. (Michie, 1931) §6412.
In spite of the general application of the doctrine to "all things lost by reason
of a judgment" it has been held not to apply where the judgment was voluntarily paid. Teasdale v. Stroller, 133 Mo. 645, 34 S. W. 873 (1896) ; Travelers
Ins. Co. v. Heath, 95 Pa. St. 333 (1880). Contra: Schooley v. Hashley, 72
N. Y. 578 (1878) ; Hiller v. Hiller, 35 Ohio St. 645 (1880). Neither does it
apply where the specific property cannot be returned. Farmer v. Rogers, 10
Cal. 335 (1858). Nor after the property is in the hands of an innocent purchaser for value. Vogler v. Montgomery, 54 Mo. 577 (1874); Dodson v.
Butler, 101 Ark. 416, 142 S.W. 503, 39 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1100, Ann. Cas.
1913E 1001 (1912). Nor against one who did not enter on land under the one
whose title was declared void by the reversal. Mayo v. Sprout, 45 Cal. 99

(1872).

But restitution can be had for crops grown on land between trial judgment and
reversal by Supreme Court. Stanborough v. Cook, 86 Iowa 741, 53 N. W.
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erty taken directly under the judgment which is reversed. 4 However, this limitation was placed upon the doctrine when the technical rules of procedure were emphasized more than they are now.5
Then, too, those cases in which restitution was refused, because the
property was not taken directly under the judgment that was reversed, did not involve the doctrine of res judicata between the two
judgments. In the instant case there is a loss of property by virtue
of a judgment (interpleader) which has been subsequently reversed.
It would be consistent to extend the doctrine to this case.
The majority of the court recognizes the equities in favor of A
by admitting that if the first judgment in ejectment had been appealed from, it probably would have been reversed; or *the appeal
would have been consolidated with the appeal in the interpleader
suit. 6 They insist, however, that an appeal in the first ejectment
action is the only remedy available to A. 7 But this is putting rules
of procedure above the justice of the cause. The second judgment
in ejectment, as Cardozo, J. suggests, should be treated as a suit for
restitution. 8
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131 (1892).
It also applies when more land is taken in ejectment than is
called for by the judgment. Russel v. Webb, 96 Ark. 190, 131 S. W. 456
(1910). Or when land other than that included in a judgment is taken. Ex
parte Reynolds, 1 Cai. 500 (N. Y. 1804); Shaw v. Bayard, 4 Pa. 257 (1846).
"Durham & N. W. Ry. Co. v. N. C. Ry. Co., 108 N. C. 304, 12 S. E.
983 (1890); Eilers v. Wood, 64 Wis. 422, 25 N. W. 440 (1885); Murry v.
Berdell, 98 N. Y. 480 (1885); Reynolds v. Reynolds, 67 Cal. 20, 8 Pac.

184 (1885).
'Dicta in more recent cases indicate a possible change of attitude. Elis v.
McGovern, 153 App. Div. 26, 137 N. Y. Supp. 1029 (1912) ; Walz v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 282 Fed. 646 (E. D. Mich. 1922); Ure v. Ure, 223 Ill. 454, 79
N. E. 153, 114 Am. St. Rep. 336 (1906).
1 It is clear that it would have been reversed. Butler v. Eaton, 141 U. S.
240, 11 Sup. Ct. 985, 35 L. ed. 713 (1891); Arkadelphia Milling Co. v. St.
Louis S. & W. Ry., 249 U. S. 134, 39 Sup. Ct. 237, 63 L. ed. 517 (1919) ; Poole
v. Seney, 70 Iowa 275, 30 N. W. 634 (1868) ; Ranson v. City of Pierre, supra
note 3; Hennessy v. Tacoma Smelting & Ref. Co., 129 Fed. 40 (C. C. A. 9th,
1904).
7
The court cites Butler v. Eaton, supra note 6, as dearly pointing out that
this was the only remedy available in this situation. But the case does not
point this out. It merely decides that when a previous judgment, upon which
the case before it depended, has been reversed, it can reverse the judgment
itself instead of sending it back to the court below.
'The proper way to obtain a writ of restitution at common law was by a
motion. Sometimes, however, the appellate court would, when it reversed the
judgment, direct the return of all property taken under authority of the
judgment. There is some authority for. allowing an action for money had.
and received in this situation. Haebler v. Meyers, 132 N. Y. 363, 30 N. E.
963, 15 A. L. R. 588, 28 Am. St. Rep. 589 (1892) is an illustration of such
an action being allowed It would not be radically out of line either with the
modem attitude toward procedure or with the idea of restitution to allow this
second action in ejectment to be treated as a suit for restitution.

